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Spouse’s relative labor supply and the degree of specialization in intermarriage might
differ from that in immigrant and native marriage for several reasons. Intermarried
couples may specialize less due to smaller comparative advantages resulting from
positive assortative mating by education, and due to different bargaining positions
within the household. The empirical analysis relies on panel data using a two limit
Random Effects Tobit framework to identify determinants of a gender-neutral
specialization index. Results indicate that for immigrants intermarriage is indeed
related to less specialization, as is similar education levels of spouses, while children
and being Muslim or Islamic are associated with greater specialization. For natives,
on the other hand, the likelihood to specialize increases with intermarriage. This
might result from differences in bargaining strength or be due to adaptation to
immigrants’ gender roles.
JEL classification: J1, J12.
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Marriages between immigrants and natives, here termed “intermarriage”, are often
viewed as indicator of social proximity and possibly a driving factor of individual economic
success. Being intermarried seems to signal greater commitment and better integration
in the hosting country, as, on average, intermarried immigrants tend to have better
education, are more likely to work in high-qualified jobs and earn more than singles
and immigrants who live with other immigrants1.
Structural characteristics of the marriage market, such as availability of potential
partners within the own ethnic group, interference of third parties, personal character-
istics such as age at immigration, years elapsed in the country and education are
among the most important factors determining intermarriages (see Kalmijn 1998).
Besides determinants of intermarriage and intermarriage patterns, research has
increasingly focused on intermarriages’ potential effects on economic outcomes
such as immigrants’ wages in the U.S., Australia, and France, and on employment
and self-employment rates, e.g. of U.S. immigrants2. However, little is known about
what happens within the household and in particular how intermarried couples
differ from immigrant and native couples with respect to the division of labor.
Some studies, starting with Baker and Benjamin (1997) and followed by Blau et al. (2003)
and Basilio et al. (2009), look at labor market behavior of immigrant families upon arrival.
They find mixed evidence for the “family investment hypothesis” which states that
immigrant wives tend to take on “dead end” jobs upon arrival in order to financeNottmeyer; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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Canada (Baker and Benjamin 1997), immigrant couples in the U.S. seem to equally in-
vest in human capital accumulation upon arrival and findings by Blau et al. (2003) do
not support this hypothesis. Equally, such behavior is not found for immigrant cou-
ples in Germany (Basilio et al. 2009)3.
This investment strategy affects the degree of labor market participation within
immigrant partnerships and is therefore related to the question addressed in this paper:
The difference in relative labor supply and the degree of specialization of intermarried
couples in comparison to immigrant and native couples, and its relation to differences
in bargaining power.
Diverging degrees of specialization could arise from smaller comparative advantages in
intermarriage due to positive assortative mating by education and differences in partners’
perceived bargaining position. The former implies that spouses have similar education
levels, which leads to more similar productivity levels and therefore similar wages. As a
consequence, opportunity costs are similar and both partners have similar incentives to
work in the labor market.
In this context, potential earnings and wages are two possible measures for bargaining
power as, for instance, Lundberg and Pollak (1996) discuss in detail. Another potential
measure of power is the perceived influence on financial decisions. Friedberg and Webb
(2006) use self-reported information about who has the “final say” in financial questions,
and Beegle et al. (2001) look at ownership of household assets to measure bargaining
power. This paper uses similar variables, namely “distribution of income” and “final say
on financial decisions”, to relate intermarriage to self-perceived bargaining power. Given
the interdependencies between perceived power, wages and hours worked, it is however
difficult to determine the direction of causality, so the aim of this paper is not to identify
causality but rather to highlight some interesting correlations.
The empirical analysis builds on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP), which offer the possibility to incorporate unobserved, time-invariant factors
(due to its panel structure) and various individual’s and couple’s characteristics (an
advantage of the richness of personal aspects covered)4. It is assumed that the degree
of specialization is the outcome of an underlying optimization problem where each
couple maximizes its combined utility function. Complete specialization - in the sense
that one partner is the main bread-winner and the other partner focuses exclusively on
home production - is thus one optimal solution of this problem. As a consequence, a
two-limit Random Effects Tobit model is used to account for these corner solutions in
the couple’s maximization problem.
To control for possible endogeneity between intermarriage and relative labor supply,
the functional form assumptions of the Tobit model are successively relaxed, leading to
an instrumental variable (IV) estimation. In that IV regression an ethnicity-gender ratio
is used as identifying restriction - similar to those proposed in previous studies on
intermarriage, e.g. by Meng and Gregory (2005). Even though its use as instrument is
not indisputable it serves well as a first indicator for how intermarriage relates to
specialization.
The analysis considers cohabiting (heterosexual) couples and proposes a gender-neutral
specialization index to measure to what extent one partner contributes to the mass of
couple’s working hours. This approach is motivated by work by Stratton (2005) and
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specialization in household tasks between married and cohabiting couples - and between
couples in the U.S. and Denmark respectively.
The decision of how much to work relative to the partner depends, among other
factors, on the expected gains from specialization and the bargaining strength of each
spouse. If expected gains are low and the risk of divorce is high, less specialization is
optimal. Plus, if bargaining strength is high more labor supply is expected.
Empirical findings indicate that intermarriage is, indeed, related to less specialization:
Especially mixed couples of immigrant men and native women are less specialized than
immigrant couples. (For immigrant women this relation also holds but is somewhat
weaker). Furthermore, intermarried immigrant men are less likely to be the sole
decision maker in the household, while in immigrant households financial decisions are
mostly made by the husband. This indicates more bargaining power of the native
partner, especially the native wife, probably due to better and more similar education,
better outside options and thus different threat points, that is different, presumably
better prospects in case of divorce5.
In contrast, natives in intermarriage seem to specialize more than native couples,
possibly indicating that natives view female labor force participation differently than
immigrants, and that intermarried natives adapt to their partners’ views in order to
mitigate conflict potential within the partnership. Hence, native couples may have more
egalitarian views which may lead to less specialization compared to couples with more
traditional role models.
In the next section the determinants and economic implications of intermarriage are
discussed. In addition, an outline of the theory behind intra-household division of labor
is given. Section 2 then explains the construction of the specialization index, followed
by a summary of definitions and the data description in Section 3. In Section 4 the
empirical results are presented and discussed including a subsection that contains some
robustness checks based on measures of bargaining power. The paper concludes with a
summary of results and an outlook for further research.1. Background
1.1. Determinants of intermarriage and its economic implications
Previous research on intermarriage primarily focused on patterns and determinants of
intermarriage, that is factors that increase the likelihood to marry outside the own
ethnic group and, in particular, to marry partners from the native population. This
strand of literature predominately evolved in traditional immigration countries such as
the U.S. and Australia, but is also increasingly prominent in Germany and other European
countries like France, Sweden and the Netherlands.
Accordingly, structural constraints in the marriage market such as gender ratio and
the availability of partners within the own ethnic community are among the most
important factors driving marriage choice (Angrist 2002). In addition, interference of
third parties (mainly parents), religious beliefs, and socio-economic status, next to
cultural norms and linguistic proximity determine the decision of whom to marry.
These factors, at least partly, explain why some immigrant groups show a greater
tendency toward intermarriage than others.
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from that of their own ethnic group, both at the lower and upper tail of the educational
distribution, are more likely to marry outside their ethnic group. In addition, there are
differences in the perception of certain ethnic groups within the native population.
Therefore, immigrants belonging to a (perceived) well educated ethnic group will
intermarry more often than immigrants from (perceived) less educated groups –
independent of their actual educational attainment level. Finally, well educated minority
groups often have different preferences, norms and values, and therefore different
attitudes towards intermarriage and gender roles. This later point shows in the differences
in the ‘‘Big Five’’ personality traits, for example (see Tables 1 and 2).
However, individual characteristics and personal preferences must not be neglected:
Immigrants are more likely to intermarry if they immigrated at young ages, spent
considerable time in the hosting country, exhibit good language skills, and, most
importantly, are highly educated (Furtado 2006; Furtado and Theodoropoulos 2011;
Chiswick and Houseworth 2008).
If partner choice would be completely random there would be no difference in
education levels between intermarried, immigrant or native couples. However, since
partner choice is not random it is not surprising to find differences in intermarried
couples with respect to education and other characteristics, of course. According to
Becker (1974), people generally match based on similar bundles of resources. However,
partners do not need to be identical in each characteristic but can compensate for
differences in one by offering greater similarities in others.
Even though everybody would probably prefer “double matches”, that is to marry
somebody with the same ethnic background and the same level of education, some
may settle for a partner with a different ethnic background as long as they match, at least,
on education6. Hence, positive assortative mating by education might be especially
important in intermarriage and partners with heterogeneous ethnic backgrounds
tend to be more similar with respect to education than couples with the same ethnic
background (see Chiswick and Houseworth 2008); (Furtado 2006); Furtado and
Theodoropoulos 2011).
Moreover, educational institutions usually serve as social platforms to meet potential
future spouses. And, as discussed in detail by Furtado 2006) and (Furtado and
Theodoropoulos 2011), better educated immigrants are assumed to be less likely to live
in ethnic enclaves and to better adapt to unfamiliar environments.
Studies on economic implications from intermarriage find mostly positive effects
from native partners, at least for immigrants: So intermarriage has positive effects
on immigrants’ earnings in Australia and France (Meng and Gregory 2005), and
(Meng and Meurs 2006)7, and on employment status and self-employment probabil-
ities for U.S. immigrants (Furtado and Theodoropoulos 2009a and 2009b; Georgarakos
and Tatsiramos 2009). In contrast, Kantarevic (2004) finds no significant effect of
intermarriage on immigrants’ earnings in the U.S. once he controls for possible
endogeneity. Until now, little is known about such relations for immigrants in
Germany.
The purpose of this paper is, however, not to explain what determines intermarriage
formation or how it affects wages or employment status but to shed some light on
internal constellations, in particular the degree of couple’s specialization.
Nottmeyer IZA Journal of Migration Page 5 of 272014, 3:3
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/31.2. Couple’s specialization
The degree of specialization depends, among others, on expected gains and associated
costs from the division of labor within the household. According to Becker (1981) –
and discussed for instance by Bonke et al. (2008) – specialization and the division of
labor are the “fundamental principles of economics and allow for production at lowest
possible costs’’. These principles create an advantage of multi-person over single-
person households and can result in household specialization to the extent that one
partner focuses mainly on labor market work while the other specializes completely in
home production. The degree of specialization and the division of tasks depends on
relative advantages and opportunity costs. Greater gains from specialization are
expected for couples with greater differences in skills and abilities Becker (1981, 1985)
so that greater differences in education will lead to more specialization. In contrast,
higher earnings and greater labor force participation of married women reduce the
gains from marriage (and raise the attractiveness of divorce) so that the sexual division
of labor within the household becomes less advantageous (Becker 1985). Who special-
izes in which tasks therefore depends mainly on resource endowment and labor market
opportunities.
Following the arguments given in the context of collective labor supply models,
couples utility can be written as the weighted sum of spouses’ individual utilities
subject to their time and budget constraints, incorporating home production. Lundberg
and Pollak (1996) give a very comprehensive overview of the development of cooperative
bargaining models, starting from common preference models that assume families to
maximize one single utility function independent of who receives and controls the
resources, covering models of marriage and divorce that allow agents to compare
their expected utility inside and outside of marriage, and moving on to cooperative
bargaining models that consider two or more agents who determine their consumption
based on distinct preferences. These models show that (Nash) bargaining solutions
depend on a threat point, that is the maximum utility level available outside of marriage,
which is determined by the ownership after divorce, for instance.
Couples maximize their joint utility function, subject to the fact that total income
consists of both partners’ labor earnings times their labor market hours (that is total
time available minus leisure time and hours spent on household work), plus non-
earned income Van Klaveren et al. (2011). Total household production is also a
weighted sum of husband’s and wife’s time spent on household work.
The weighting factor in the utility function represents each partner’s bargaining power,
and captures, for instance, relative resource endowment, time availability, outside options
and egalitarian views. Members with the most “power” will tend to do less housework and
engage more in labor market work (Bonke et al. 2008). In this context, “power” is
related to comparative advantages and better outside options (Hersch and Stratton
1994). The weighting factor in the household production function may alter from 1 in
order to account for different productivity levels in household production between
husbands and wives. It is assumed that the observed labor supply of each spouse is
the optimal solution of this maximization problem given each partner’s bargaining
strength.
According to Van Klaveren et al. (2011) bargaining power depends mainly on labor
market earnings, the number of children living in the household, the age of the
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power is difficult.
Van Klaveren et al. (2011) therefore rely mainly on functional form assumptions to
solve the measurement issue. Previous research has used wages (e.g. Chiappori et al.
2002) or annual earnings (e.g. Fuwa 2004) to determine bargaining power. Accord-
ingly, those with higher expected wages/earnings, and therefore higher opportunity
costs, are expected to contribute more time to labor market work. Using wages or
earnings is however not unquestionable. While Pollak (2005) suggests using wages
rather than earnings because they may vary with hours worked, this still requires to
observe wages for both partners and to concentrate on dual earner households. This
restriction might impose sample selection and exclude more traditionally focused
households. Stratton and Gupta (2008) therefore propose to look at relative education
instead when analyzing the effect of bargaining on leisure time. Education is a
determinant of earnings but the investment decision is made early in life. Hence,
education is pre-defined and impacts the distribution of power already at the beginning of
a relationship, before the division of tasks. In addition, it can be observed for everybody
and is hence not subjective to selection like earning may be.
Other studies, such as by Luehrmann and Maurer (2007) or Beegle et al. (2001) use
self-reported information to detect bargaining strength. Beegle et al. (2001) consider
the ownership of assets/share of household assets as indicator of economic power
while Friedberg and Webb (2006) use information about who has the final say in
household decisions to reveal whose preferences are reflected. (A similar variable
is used in this study as robustness check to depict different decision patterns in
intermarriage, in immigrant and in native marriages.)
Other determinants of the degree of specialization are time constraints and mar-
riage market conditions. Accordingly, the least time constrained party will do the
house work while the more time constraint partner will specialize in labor market
work (Bonke et al. 2008). Conditions in marriage markets like sex ratios determine
female labor force participation, e.g. in the U.S. (Grossbard and Amuedo-Dorantes
2007), and divorce laws affect the costs of separation and hence spouses’ threat
points within marriage. If divorce bounds are tight there is little scope for bargaining
so that institutions may impact the division of tasks between men and women by
affecting threat points within the partnership. The optimal degree of specialization
therefore depends on the stability of marital environment and the availability of
alternative marital partners, as (Lundberg and Pollak 1996) point out.
Culture, ideology, and social norms, as well as preferences and the importance of
individual beliefs about, for instance, gender roles (“doing gender”) play an important role
in the division of labor as well (Bittmann et al. 2003). As (Stratton and Gupta 2008) show,
costs associated with deviating from social norms and benefits associated with behaving
according to individual beliefs are crucial. Lundberg and Pollak (1996) argue that history
and culture might generate a “self-evident way to play” (p. 151) so that complete gender
specialization in the provision of household goods corresponds to conventional gender
assignments of responsibilities. In other words, social recognition and sanctioning
gender roles may assign responsibilities of certain activities to husbands and wives.
In line with this, couples with more egalitarian views – mainly younger, more liberated
people – divide tasks more equally (Fuwa 2004), while couples with more traditional role
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and Spitz from 1983 that finds that better educated women have more egalitarian sex role
attitudes and therefore do less housework – while better educated men do more housework.
Moreover, they find differences in the division of household labor for different ethnic and
racial groups in the U.S. such as African-Americans, Hispanics, Japanese and South Korean
men as well as Soviet women. This indicates that traditions and home culture may play a
role in the division of labor as well and that more traditional societies may specialize more8.
Finally, the optimal degree of specialization is related to the expected duration of
the partnership. As Bonke et al. (2008) explain, the longer the expected period of
specialization the lower the present value of costs of changing tasks when the relationship
ends, and the greater the degree of specialization (p. 1033). As a consequence, the degree
of specialization is a function of the expected duration of marriage with more enduring
relationships inducing a higher degree of specialization Stratton (2005). Consequently,
partners should specialize more if the risk of divorce is low and partners expect the
relationship to last long9.1.3. Working hypotheses
Relating these arguments to intermarriage implies that intermarried couples may be
less specialized than immigrant couples for the following reasons:
(1) Intermarried spouses tend to have similar education due to enhanced assortative
mating by education. Accordingly, intermarried immigrants seem to compensate for
differences in ethnicity with greater similarity in education (see Chiswick and
Houseworth 2008). This leads to similar productivity levels of partners in
intermarriage and hence smaller comparative advantages of one partner over the
other. It reduces incentives to specialize and results in less division of labor. In
contrast, immigrant and native couples are, by definition, ethnically homogeneous
and hence may place less emphasis on similar education. Consequently, a higher
comparative advantage of one partner is expected leading to greater specialization
within those partnerships as compared to intermarriages.
(2) Bargaining power in intermarriage might be shifted to the native partner due to
better labor market – and hence outside – options. The native partner is more
familiar with the host country’s customs, norms, and peculiarities, has a better
knowledge of the local labor market, faces less discrimination based on ethnicity,
and exhibits better host country specific skills requested by native employers.Adding to that, (in Germany) the native spouse might “dominate” the immigrant
partner if the immigrant’s permission of residence depends solely on the marital
status and the immigrant is threatened with expulsion in case of divorce.
Residential status of non-German nationals from non-EU member states who come
to Germany exclusively based on marriage with German nationals, depends to a
great extent on the duration of that marital union. Intermarried bi-national couples
need to spend a considerable time “living their marriage” before the immigrant
spouse receives an autonomous right of residence (eigenstaendiges Aufenhaltsrecht).
Hence, especially within the first years after immigration, divorce could lead to
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case of divorce, the distribution of bargaining power within the marriage, and
therefore relative labor supply patterns10.
(3) Marriages of very religious immigrants, in particular Muslims, often do not give a
“de facto” possibility to divorce. Consequently, a higher degree of specialization is
expected for immigrant and particularly Muslim couples11.
(4) Finally, intermarried couples may be exposed to more conflict potential because of
their different cultural background (see Stoecker-Zafari 2007), and intermarriage
might be associated with an increase in severe distress (see Bratter and Eschbach
(2005)). Hence, intermarriages may be expected to end earlier than ethnically
homogeneous marriages which will lead to less specialization – as discussed by
Lundberg and Rose (1998), the shorter the expected duration of marriage and the
higher the risk of divorce the lower the degree of specialization12.In relation to native couples differences are more ambiguous: Native couples may
represent either more traditional or more modern concepts of division of labor. On the
one hand, because they are homogeneous with respect to ethnicity, spouses might differ
more in educational attainment than intermarried couples and thus specialize more. On
the other hand, natives might have more egalitarian views with respect to female labor
force participation, and hence specialize less. Moreover, getting divorced and re-marry
might be more common and less socially sanctioned among (German) natives which may
affect threat points within the partnership. The degree of specialization in intermarriages
can thus differ from or resemble that of native couples.
2. Measure of the degree of specialization
The variable of interest is the degree of specialization in labor market work measured
by the index Sit. A similar index has been used previously by Stratton (2005) and
Bonke et al. (2008) to measure the degree of intra-household specialization, and has
been adopted here to apply their idea to labor market work. Sit is defined as:





This index is gender neutral and captures whether one partner supplies the bulk of
working hours in period t or whether working hours are equally distributed between
spouses. It is normalized between zero and one, with Sit = 0 referring to the situation
when both partners spend the same amount of hours on labor market work - that is
when the average number of working hours per weekday of individual i, hit, equals h−it,
the average number of working hours per weekday of its i’s partner -i. Complete
specialization in labor market work of one spouse is reached when either hit or h−it
equals 0. In that case Sit = 1
13.
An increase in Sit clearly indicates more specialization, whereas a decrease in Sit
unambiguously indicates more similarity in terms of supplied labor hours. In the majority
of observations, husbands provide at least as many hours of labor market work as their
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the husband is the single bread-winner in the household, that is to more traditional
gender roles.
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) gives information about hours spent on
labor market work, household work, child care, repairs and other activities including
hobbies. The structure of how this information is gathered changes slightly over time. For
instance, in the first wave interviewers ask about time allocation during the workweek,
that is Monday to Saturday, and on Sundays. Later the distinction is made between
Monday to Friday, Saturday, and Sunday - but only for alternating years. For the years
in between, only weekly hours (Monday to Friday) are surveyed14. These changes
result in slightly different answer schemes and do not allow for direct comparison of
working hours in one year with working hours in the subsequent year. To circumvent
this problem the index is constructed such that it does not rely on the absolute but
the relative amount of working hours: It is assumed that both partners make the same
multiplicative adjustment ε to the different question schemes. Then, in every alternating
year, the reported value is hjt = hjt(1 + ε) instead of hjt, for j ∈ {i, − i}. Using the proposed
specialization ratio eliminates such errors because:
hit 1þ εð Þ
hit 1þ εð Þ þ h−it 1þ εð Þ ¼
hit
hit þ h−it
So to sum up, this specialization index Sit has three major advantages: (a) it isgender-neutral, (b) it can be easily interpreted in the sense that an increase in Sit
reflects an increase in specialization and more traditional gender roles, and (c) it does
not depend on the design of the questionnaires.
3. Data
3.1. Definitions
Similar to Becker (1974), “marriage” is defined as “sharing the same household”. The
underlying sample is hence restricted to people who report a partner living in the same
household. In the final sample about 86 percent of those partnerships refer to formal
marriage (“married, living together”). Marriage is therefore used interchangeably of
partnership or cohabitation, and partners are addressed as spouses, husbands and wives
even though they might not be formally married15.
A partnership between an immigrant and a native is called “intermarriage” and is
used in the sense of “marriage into the native society”. Marital constellations between
two immigrants/two natives are called “immigrant/native marriages”. Note that spouses
in immigrant marriages can come from the different countries of origin as long as both
exhibit a “migration background” – having a migration background refers to being born
outside of Germany, having non-German citizenship, being born to parents who do not
hold German citizenship or to parents who were not born in Germany.
First generation immigrants are defined as people not born in Germany. Those who
are born in Germany but (a) do not hold German citizenship, or (b) have at least one
parent who is not German-born or of non-German nationality are called second
generation immigrants. Both first and second generation immigrants are considered in
this analysis, assuming that members of the second generation are not fully assimilated
and still differ in their behavior, at least partly, from natives. Marriage between first and
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between natives and second generation immigrants are considered intermarriages.
People are included in the sample only when a current partner is observed and when
they report non-missing working hours. One person can be observed with different
partners and it is assumed that former marriages do not influence future marriages16.3.2. Sample construction
The focus of this study lies on the working age population, hence people aged 20 to 65.
People are included independent of their working status, so that the analysis includes
full and part time employed, occasionally employed, unemployed and people who are
still enrolled in school17.
Due to different questioning schemes in alternating years (see Section 2), only every
second year is considered. Furthermore, language information and information about
the nationality of the best friend is available only for 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005.
Hence, these are the years considered in this study18.
2005 data have the additional advantage of containing information about the so-called
“Big Five” personality traits that give insight to one’s self-perception with respect to (i)
openness, (ii) agreeableness, (iii) conscientiousness, (iv) neuroticism/emotional stability,
and (v) extraversion. These traits model the basic structure of people’s personality
and capture different modes of behavior and experience. They are used in the fields
of psychology and sociology to analyze personality structures and are based on
information about individual communicative ability, agreeableness, originality, and
imaginativeness; work attitudes, attitudes towards worry and towards stress; self-restraint,
cordiality, and artistic and aesthetic experiences, all measured on a self-report
basis19. A factor analysis of these responses is conducted and the data are grouped
into an aggregate value for each of the five traits.
In 2005 information is also available on how income is distributed between spouses
and who has the final say in financial decisions. This information is used in robustness
testing to support the argument that bargaining power is differently distributed in
intermarriage than in other marital unions.3.3. Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 show selected characteristics of men and women in either intermarriage,
immigrant or native partnerships. The numbers refer to two-year observations available
between 1997 and 2005. They compare immigrant men and women in intermarriage
with those in immigrant marriages, and native men and women in intermarriage with
those in native marriages.
Roughly 18 percent of the observations are immigrants, 82 percent are natives.
Immigrants living in Germany predominately immigrated during the ‘‘guest worker’’
recruitment period of the 1950s to 1970s, the family reunification after the recruitment
stop in 1973, as asylum seekers, or as ‘‘ethnic Germans’’ after the fall of the Iron Curtain20.
Most immigrant men (in the sample) originate from Turkey, Italy, Poland, Greece, and
states of former Yugoslavia, while immigrant women mainly came from Turkey, Italy,
Poland, Russia, and Greece21.
Table 1 Selected characteristics of men
Immigrant Native
Selected characteristics Intermarriage Immigrant marriage Intermarriage Native marriage
Number of Obs.1 3,831 (18.1%) 17, 283 (80.9%)
Working hours per weekday:
0 11.4% 11.4% 10.3% 9.3%
8-10 63.2% 73.2 61.3% 61.7%
11-12 17.4% 8.9% 18.9% 19.8%
Marriage pattern 869 2,962 819 16, 464
(22.7%) (77.3%) (4.7%) (95.3)
Labor hours 8.5 8.1 8.7 8.8
Partner’s labor hours 5.4 3.9 4.7 5.4
Household hours 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4
Partner’s household hours 3.9 4.8 3.9 4.0
Years of education 12.1 10.5 12.6 12.7
Difference in education 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3
Age at marriage 29.2 25.4 30.9 28.4
Duration of marriage 13.2 17.6 13.7 17.3
Years since immigration 26.2 19.7 / /
Age at immigration 16.7 23.1 / /
Language2 (German):
Speaking 1.4 2.3 / /
Writing 2.0 2.8 / /
Identity3: 2.8 3.1 / /
with Germany







Risk proclivity5: 5.2 4.3 5.2 5.1
Origin of best friend:
East or West Germany 73.0% 32.4% 90.7% 99.1%
Other country 27.0% 67.6% 9.3% 0.9%
Distribution of income:
Each manages money separately 19.7% 3.9% 17.6% 16.1%
I manage, partner receives portion 4.8% 10.9% 8.4% 3.8%
Partner manages, I receive portion 6.1% 9.4% 4.6% 6.7%
All money shared 59.7% 72.9% 61.2% 63.9%
Part shared, part kept separate 9.6% 2.9% 8.2% 9.6%
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Table 1 Selected characteristics of men (Continued)
Final say financial decisions:
Myself 9.0% 16.6% 10.8% 7.1%
Partner 11.3% 6.2% 5.9% 6.1%
Both 79.7% 77.2% 83.3% 83.8%
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel, years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005.
1Those numbers refer to observations not to individuals, unweighted sample, years 1995 to 2005.
2Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (= very good) to 5 (= very poor).
3Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (= strong) to 5 (= poor).
4Values are conducted from a factor analysis; positive/negative***: significant differences between those intermarried and
those who are not.
5Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (= highly risk averse) to 10 (= highly risk loving).
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(only about 5 percent among natives). Among immigrants this share is considerably
higher, namely about 22 percent22.
Intermarried native men most often live with women from Poland, Italy, Austria,
states formerly belonging to Yugoslavia, Russia, France, the Philippines and Romania,
while intermarried native women are often married to men from Italy, Turkey, Spain,
Greece, former Yugoslavia or Poland23. So these men come mainly from countries with
more paternalistic family structures and different gender roles compared to Germans
which might explain some of the later results.
The majority (63 to 73 percent) of immigrant men work on average 8 to 10 hours per
weekday. About 9 percent in immigrant marriages and 17 percent in intermarriages
work slightly more, namely 11 to 12 hours. Among native men, the share of those
working 8 to 10 hours is slightly smaller (only about 61 percent). However, a greater
share (about 19 percent) works 11 to 12 hours. Among native women between 27 and
29 percent report not to work. For immigrant women this share is noticeably bigger,
particularly among those in immigrant partnerships (with almost 45 percent). In
contrast, among the intermarried the share of women reporting zero hours of work is
only 34 percent which is noticeably closer to the shares of natives. About 25 percent of
women in immigrant marriage work 8 to 10 hours. Among native and immigrant women
in intermarriage this share is considerably higher, namely 28 to almost 35 percent. Thus,
women in intermarriages tend to work more than those in ethnically homogeneous
partnerships.
On average, native men in intermarriage do not differ much from men in native
marriages with regards to the presented characteristics. Accordingly, for natives the gap in
education between spouses is the same in native partnerships and intermarriages. There
are no statistically significant differences in natives’ answers to the big five and risk
proclivity questions. However, intermarriages do not last as long as marriages between
natives and native men in intermarriage are more likely to report having the final say on
financial decisions than men in native relationships. This suggests more traditional gender
roles in marriages between native men and immigrant women than within native couples.
There are also no statistically relevant differences between intermarried native
women and those in native marriages in most characteristics. However, while average
years of schooling in intermarriages and native marriages are almost identical, the
difference in education is not: While native women who live with native men have
about half a year less of education than the native partner, in intermarriage the educational
Table 2 Selected characteristics of women
Immigrant Native
Selected characteristics Intermarriage Immigrant marriage Intermarriage Native marriage
Number of Obs.1 3,976 (18.2%) 17,833 (81.8%)
Working hours per weekday:
0 34.3% 44.7% 29.8% 27.3%
8-10 28.6% 25.3% 34.5% 32.5%
11-12 4.1% 1.7% 4.8% 5.3%
Marriage Pattern 870 3,106 893 16,490
(21.9%) (78.1%) (5.0%) (95.0%)
Labor hours 4.5 3.7 5.2 5.2
Partner’s labor hours 8.7 8.1 8.6 8.9
Household hours 4.0 4.9 4.0 4.0
Partner’s household hours 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.4
Years of education 12.3 10.2 12.2 12.3
Age at marriage 27.9 22.4 27.8 25.9
Duration of marriage 13.6 18.0 13.3 17.4
Years since immigration 21.9 17.9 / /
Age at immigration 20.2 22.4 / /
Language2 (German): 1.5 2.3 / /
Speaking
Writing 1.9 2.8 / /
Identity3:
with Germany 2.7 3.1 / /







Risk proclivity5: 4.1 3.0 4.1 4.2
Origin of best friend:
East or West Germany 701% 32.4% 91.3% 98.9%
Other country 29.9% 67.6% 8.7% 1.1%
Distribution of income:
Each manages money separately 17.6% 4.1% 20.5% 16.0%
I manage, partner receives portion 3.9% 9.2% 6.8% 6.1%
Partner manages, I receive portion 7.9% 11.7% 5.5% 4.1%
All money shared 62.5% 72.0% 59.2% 64.2%
Part shared, part kept separate 8.2% 3.0% 8.1% 9.6%
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Table 2 Selected characteristics of women (Continued)
Final say in financial decisions:
Myself 6.0% 6.7% 9.3% 5.5%
Partner 11.5% 16.7% 9.3% 6.9%
Both 82.5% 76.6% 81.3% 87.7%
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel, years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005.
1Those numbers refer to observations not to individuals, unweighted sample, years 1995 to 2005.
2Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (= very good) to 5 (= very poor).
3Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (= strong) to 5 (= poor).
4Values are conducted from a factor analysis; positive/negative***: significant differences between those intermarried and
those who are not.
5Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (= highly risk averse) to 10 (= highly risk loving).
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than native partnerships and answers to the personality traits and risk attitudes do not differ
significantly. Finally, a higher percentage of native women reports that each spouse manages
his/her income separately in intermarriage than in natives partnerships. In other words,
native women are more likely to have the final say on financial decisions if they are
intermarried.
For immigrants, differences by marriage type are considerably stronger: Immigrant men
in intermarriage work more hours per weekday than other immigrants. They devote about
the same amount of hours to household tasks in intermarriage as in immigrant marriage,
whereas native wives spend more time working in the labor market and less time with
household work than immigrant wives. Furthermore, intermarried immigrant men have
significantly more education than those in immigrant partnerships, and the difference in
education between spouses is noticeably smaller and even insignificant in intermarriage.
Moreover, those who live with natives have spent more years in the hosting country,
immigrated at younger ages, report better linguistic abilities - both with respect to speak-
ing and writing skills - and feel more attached to Germany. On top of that, they are more
risk loving than immigrant men in marriages with other immigrants and more likely to re-
port a best German friend. They are, according to their self-assessment, more open and
have higher values of extraversion than men in immigrant marriages – even though men
in immigrant marriages view themselves as more agreeable. A noticeably higher percent-
age of immigrant men reports that each spouse manages his/her own money separ-
ately when they are intermarried. And, most strikingly, only 9 percent of immigrant
men in intermarriage report to have the last word in financial decisions, in contrast
to over 16 percent of men in immigrant marriages.
Similar patterns evolve for immigrant women: Those intermarried provide more
hours of labor market work but spend less time on household tasks than women in
immigrant partnerships. Immigrant wives with native husbands have considerably
more years of education, although differences in education between partners are as
big in intermarriages as in immigrant partnerships. Intermarried immigrant women
have spent more time in Germany, immigrated at younger ages, report better linguistic
proficiency and a greater identification with Germany. They are less risk averse than
women in immigrant marriages, are more often friends with Germans and view
themselves as more open and outgoing. Over 17 percent of immigrant women in
intermarriage report that each spouse manages his/her own money separately, which
contrasts to only 4 percent among women in immigrant marriages. Adding to that,
Nottmeyer IZA Journal of Migration Page 15 of 272014, 3:3
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/3almost 17 percent of women in immigrant partnerships report that the partner
makes the final decisions on financial aspects, but only about 11 percent of intermar-
ried immigrant women make the same claim.
The descriptive findings imply that positive assortative matching by education is most
severe in marriages between immigrant men and native women, and that bargaining
strength of women is stronger in intermarriages than in immigrant marriages. Both are
in line with the hypotheses stated earlier.4. Estimation results
4.1. Two-limit random effects Tobit
The specialization index Sit is limited between zero and one. This is not an issue of
data observability but part of its construction. It is therefore suitable to use a two-limit
Random Effects Tobit regression to model corner solutions. Sit is the observable
outcome that equals 0 and 1 with positive probability, and is continuous between
those two limits. The structural equation in this model is a latent variable with
Sit ¼ βXit þ uit, with uit ~ N(0, σ). The observed outcome Sit, that is the degree of
specialization in the household, is the solution of a maximization problem solved by each
individual. The explanatory variables used to determine the outcome of this maximization
problem are: own education, educational difference between spouses, age, age difference
between spouses, duration of marriage and of intermarriage, number of children younger
than 16 living in the household, religious beliefs (“being Muslim/Islamic”), and German
and home countries’ language skills24.
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimated marginal effects on the probability that the
specialization index Sit is smaller than 1, that is on the probability that the couple isTable 3 Impact of intermarriage on specialization - for immigrant men










Intermarriage 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 1.745***
Education 0.006 0.011** 0.027*** 0.044*** 0.026**
More educ5 × difference in educ -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.039*** -0.050*** -0.031**
Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.004* 0.002 -0.009
Older × difference in age 0.007* 0.008** 0.006 0.002 0.022**
Duration of marriage 0.005** 0.006** 0.004 -0.000 0.024**
Duration of intermarriage -0.005* -0.006** -0.007* -0.007** -0.081***
Children younger than 16 -0.128*** -0.146*** -0.090*** -0.049** 0.018
Being Muslim/Islamic -0.123*** -0.213*** -0.202*** -0.172*** -0.166***
Good German language skills -0.030*** -0.026** -0.029** -0.013 0.045
Good skills in language of home country -0.012 -0.028** -0.014 0.007 -0.027
Estimation coefficient of the IV on intermarriage variable in first stage: -0.742***
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel, years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005.
Male immigrants aged 20 to 65; Comparison of those in intermarriage with those in immigrant marriages.
Clustered standard errors; * p ≤ 0:05, ** p ≤ 0:01, *** p ≤ 0:001.
1Entries refer to marginal effects on the probability that both spouses work.
2Modified Dep. Var.: = 1 if both spouses work, = 0 if only one partner works.
3Entries refer to estimation coefficients using the same modified dep. Var. as in the logit regression.
4IV ¼ number of opposite sex in the same ethnic group and the federal statetotal number of opposite sex in the federal state .
5Implying that this person has more years of schooling than his/her partner.
Table 4 Impact of intermarriage on specialization - for immigrant women










Intermarriage 0.084* 0.059 0.088* 0.094* 0.662*
Education 0.005 0.008* 0.020*** 0.037*** 0.034***
More educ5 × difference in educ 0.007 0.004 -0.007 -0.018* -0.016
Age -0.007*** -0.005** -0.000 0.006** -0.001
Older × difference in age 0.005 0.008 0.003 -0.003 0.002
Duration of marriage 0.004** 0.005** 0.002 -0.001 0.008
Duration of intermarriage -0.007** -0.008** -0.009** -0.010*** -0.034**
Children younger than 16 -0.150*** -0.151*** -0.103*** -0.063** -0.042
Being Muslim/Islamic -0.079*** -0.150*** -0.141*** -0.109*** -0.076**
Good German language skills -0.066*** -0.079*** -0.065** 0.048*** 0.043***
Good skills in language of home country -0.008 -0.026** -0.010 0.012 0.007
Estimation coefficient of the IV on intermarriage variable in first stage: -0.997***
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel, years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005.
Female immigrants aged 20 to 65; Comparison of those in intermarriage with those in immigrant marriages.
Clustered standard errors; * p ≤ 0:05, ** p ≤ 0:01, *** p ≤ 0:001.
1Entries refer to marginal effects on the probability that both spouses work.
2Modified Dep. Var.: = 1 if both spouses work, = 0 if only one partner works.
3Entries refer to estimation coefficients using the same modified dep. Var. as in the logit regression
4IV ¼ number of opposite sex in the same ethnic group and the federal statetotal number of opposite sex in the federal state .
5Implying that this person has more years of schooling than his/her partner.
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specialization and more equal provision of labor market hours.
First, the results for immigrants are discussed – comparing intermarried immigrants
and those in immigrant marriages - second, natives in intermarriages and in native
marriages are compared. Differentiation by gender is important since bargaining
positions might differ in partnerships of immigrant men and native women as opposed to
native men with immigrant women. In the first case the bargaining position of the (native)
wife might be stronger than in ethnically homogeneous marriage, while in the second case
the bargaining position of the (immigrant) wife might be similar or weaker.
4.1.1. Comparing immigrants in intermarriage with immigrant marriages
For the relevant years, 1,130 immigrant men in either intermarriage or immigrant
partnerships are observed. For them the corresponding marginal effect on the probability
that the index is smaller than one is positive (0.13***) and highly statistically significant
(Table 3, column 1). Since an index value of one refers to complete specialization of one
spouse (mostly the husband) the probability to live in a household where both partners
work (Sit < 1) increases noticeably with intermarriage. Even though own years of schooling
are insignificant for determining the division of labor, the probability to specialize rises
with each additional year of schooling that the immigrant man achieved more than his
wife25. In addition, the probability to specialize increases with immigrant’s age but not
with the age gap between spouses. The probability to live in a partnership with two
working partners increases in the duration of marriage (marginal effect of 0.005**).
However, the magnitude is very small and there is no change in the degree of
specialization within intermarriage – in that case the two effects offset each other.
Among the most prominent factors determining the division of labor in the household
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if children under the age of 16 are present in the household (negative marginal effect
of −0,13***). The same holds for Muslim immigrants (−0.12***) so that the chance to
live in a fully specialized household rises noticeably if the immigrant reports to exhibit
Islamic beliefs or to be Muslim.
Estimates of language abilities which are measured on a scale from “very good skills”
(=1) to “very poor abilities” (=5) indicate that those who report to have better German
speaking proficiency (which corresponds to a smaller value of that variable) are more
likely to live in dual-worker households. Speaking the home country language seems
not significant for determining the division of labor for immigrant men26.
The specialization index is gender neutral in the sense that it does not allow for
unambiguous determination of who specializes in labor market work – the husband or
the wife. To support the argument that an increase in Sit refers to more traditional gender
roles, the same regressions are run for immigrant men who contribute at least as
many labor work hours as their wives – indicating traditional gender roles. In this
case, an increase in the index can unambiguously be interpreted as following more
traditional gender roles in the sense that the husband is the single bread-winner and
the wife concentrates exclusively on household tasks. Since the vast majority of cases
(about 80 percent) refer to this category it is not surprising to find that this restriction
does not change estimation results qualitatively - in contrast, the negative relationship
between intermarriage and specialization becomes even more pronounced27.
The data set contains information for 1,188 immigrant women living in partnerships
during the relevant years. For these women the likelihood to live in a fully specialized
partnership also decreases in intermarriage (Table 4, column 1). Hence, those who live
with a native husband are more likely to live in a household where both spouses work
than those who live with another immigrant. However, the relationship is smaller than
for immigrant men and only significant at the 10 percent level. While educational
attainment is insignificant, older immigrant women tend to live in more specialized
relationships than younger ones – supporting the assumption that younger generations
adopt more egalitarian views with regard to female labor force participation28. There
seem to be no effects from additional years being intermarried, whereas duration of
marriage per se slightly increases the likelihood that both spouses work. Again, children
living in the household as well as being Muslim or Islamic increases the probability of
fully specialization drastically. Speaking the German language decreases this likelihood.
Further regressions include years since migration (and years since migration squared),
belonging to the second generation of immigrants, coming from EU member states and
having Turkish roots. Table 5 presents only the corresponding marginal effect estimates
and the intermarriage coefficient as selected outcomes and shows that all of these
additional regressors are interesting per se but leave the impact of intermarriage
principally untouched (except for marginal effects turning insignificant for immigrant
women when controlling for Turkish origin).
The impact of “years since migration” can be related to the “family investment
hypothesis” outlined previously (see Baker and Benjamin (1997), Blau et al. (2003), and
Basilio et al. (2009) for further information) starting that the degree of specialization
should increase over time if this hypothesis holds: Baker and Benjamin (1997) argue
that immigrant women are willing to take on “dead end” jobs upon arrival to support
Table 5 Additional RE Tobit regression for immigrants - selected outcomes
Dep. Var.: RE Tobit1
Specialization index Men (1) Women (2)
Intermarriage- leaving out educational differences 0.212*** 0.087**
Intermarriage 0.182*** 0.032
years since immigration 0.000 0.009**
Intermarriage 0.141*** -0.083*
Dummy of 2nd generation -0.076* 0.037
Intermarriage 0.105** 0.079*
Dummy for EU member state 0.077** 0.046**
Intermarriage 0.111*** 0.068
Dummy for Turkish origin -0.200*** -0.154***
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
Immigrants aged 20 to 65; Unbalanced panel, years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005.
Comparison of those in intermarriage with those in immigrant marriages.
Clustered standard errors; * p ≤ 0:05, ** p ≤ 0:01, *** p ≤ 0:001.
1Entries refer to marginal effects on the probability that both spouses work.
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by and as husbands integrate better into the host country’s labor market, immigrant
wives would give up their jobs and concentrate more on home production, implying
more specialization over time (Sit → 1). However, for immigrant women, the effect
goes in the other direction as the degree of specialization decreases with years since
immigration. This means that the family investment hypothesis is not support by these
data and that results are more in line with Blau et al. (2003) and Basilio et al. (2009) who
find no support for this hypothesis either in the U.S. and in Germany.
The dummy variable for belonging to the “second generation” picks up arguments
given in the dynamic model of cultural learning by Fernandez (2013), for instance.
Accordingly, immigrant women learn about female labor force participation over
time. This would imply that second generation immigrant women would have higher
participation rates and hence live in less specialized partnerships (Sit → 0). However,
this variable is not significant for immigrant women, so that these data do not
support this idea.
Coming from an EU member state decreases the degree of specialization for both
immigrant men and women while being Turkish is associated with living in more
specialized partnerships for both. This implies that lower risk of expulsion in case of
divorce and different cultural background may play a crucial role in the determination
of specialization as well.
4.1.2. Comparing natives in intermarriage with native marriages
Between 1997 and 2005 a total of 5,874 native men are observed. In contrast to immigrants,
intermarriage is associated with more(!) specialization for native men (Table 6, column 1).
Accordingly, the probability to completely specialize increases for intermarried native
men – compared to men in native marriages. More years of education, on the other
hand, lead to less specialization, while an increase in the educational gap between
partners again increases the incentive to divide tasks and thus the probability to
specialize. As for immigrants, duration of marriage has no noticeable effect, while
children seem to be crucial and explain most of couple’s division of labor.
Table 6 Impact of intermarriage on specialization - natives
Dep. Var.: RE Tobit1
Specialization index Men (1) Women(2)
Intermarriage -0.085** -0.075**
Education 0.018*** 0.019***
More educ5 × difference in educ -0.022*** -0.004
Age -0.010*** -0.012***
Older × difference in age 0.006 0.007**
Duration of marriage 0.001 0.001*
Duration of intermarriage -0.001 0.002
Children younger than 16 -0.152*** -0.152***
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
Natives aged 20 to 65; Unbalanced panel, years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005.
Comparison of those in intermarriage with those in native marriages.
Clustered standard errors; * p ≤ 0:05, ** p ≤ 0:01, *** p ≤ 0:001.
1Entries refer to marginal effects on the probability that both spouses work.
5Implying that this person has more years of schooling than his/her partner.
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for native men, intermarriage increases(!) the probability to specialize compared to being
married to native men (Table 6, column 2). As before, the probability to completely
specialize is lower for better-educated women, although exhibiting more education than the
spouse does not alter the division of labor. Similar to immigrant women, older native
women tend to live in more specialized partnerships, whereas being older than the husband
increases the probability that both partners work. (This effect could be explained by arguing
that in traditional families the husband is usually older than the wife. If the wife is older than
the husband, this already expresses more modern perspectives which are reflected also in
more modern views on female labor market participation and a more equal share of labor.)
Again, duration of marriage seems to play only a minor role for relative labor supply,
whereas children determine most of the couple’s distribution of labor supply.
4.1.3. Summary – random effects Tobit
Summing up results from the two-limit Random Effects Tobit regressions: Intermarried
immigrant men live in less specialized partnerships than men in immigrant partnerships.
This might be due to (a) greater assortative mating by education and hence less
comparative advantages in the marriage, and (b) a better bargaining position of
native wives compared to immigrant wives. Specialization also seems less frequent
in intermarriages for immigrant women. However, assortative mating is not so
pronounced and the bargaining position of immigrant wives might not be much
different in the two types of partnerships.
In contrast, natives specialize more when intermarried than in native marriages.
Although this seems to contradict expectations at first sight, it could be explained by
(a) native women being often married to immigrant men who come from countries
with more traditional gender roles such as Turkey and Italy. They might thus be willing
to compromise on classical gender roles and accept a more traditional allocation of
labor in order to mitigate conflict potential in the partnership; (b) native men might
specialize more when intermarried because of a weaker bargaining position of immigrant
wives compared to native wives.
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One of the main shortcomings of the Random Effects models is that it does not allow
the unobserved individual factors to correlate with the explanatory variables. This is
somewhat dissatisfying as intermarriage choice and the division of labor within the
household may both be affected by unobserved factors such as ambitions, openness to
new cultures and egalitarian views. As discussed in the data section, intermarried and
non-intermarried immigrants differ, for example, in their replies to the big five
questions. So it can be expected that they also exhibit different characteristics that
might determine both partner choice and relative labor supply. Omitting such factors
will then bias estimation results.
To address this endogeneity issue by using an instrumental variable approach, it is
necessary to show that altering the functional form of the estimation model does not
affect the empirical results. At first, instead of the Random Effects Tobit a simple Tobit
is estimated on the whole data set (including observations from all years), using
clustered standard errors to correct for dependences within individuals. As shown in
the second columns of Tables 3 and 4 this does not change results dramatically.
In a next step, a new binary variable is generated which equals 1 in case that both
partners work, and 0 in case of complete specialization. Columns 3 show the estimated
marginal effects from a corresponding Logit regression that uses this modified
specialization index as dependent variable – the entries report marginal effects on the
probability to live in a dual-worker partnership (index equals 1). Again, results are fairly
stable and close to the Tobit results.
As argued by Angrist and Pischke (2008), functional form assumptions underlying
the Logit regression can sometimes be ignored and a simple Linear Probability Model
(LPM) will lead to the same results. This argument is supported by findings presented
in columns 4 showing that the Logit marginal effects are almost identical to the OLS
estimates.
In a final step an IV estimation is proposed to account for the endogeneity problem.
The applied instrument (an ethnicity-gender ratio) is similar to that introduced by
Meng and Gregory (2005) which into account that the probability to intermarry
depends to a great amount on the availability of potential partners and hence the
opportunity structure of the marriage market. The instrument used here is the ratio
between the number of members of the opposite sex within the own ethnic groups in a
certain region (in this case the federal state) and the total number of members of the
opposite sex in that area29. The smaller the ratio the less likely it is to meet a potential
partner from the same ethnic group and the more likely it is to marry someone from
outside the own ethnic community, in particular from the native population. As a
consequence, a negative effect of that ratio on the probability to intermarry is expected.
As shown in the last row of columns 5, this negative relationship is indeed found, as the
corresponding estimation coefficients of the first stage regressions of the 2SLS estimations
are negative and highly significant. Furthermore, the coefficients of the intermarriage
indicators in the second stage are still significant at the same level and increased
noticeably in size. The downward bias of the OLS estimate might hence result from
omitting important factors that affect both intermarriage choice and the degree of
specialization. If, for instance, ambitions increase the probability to find a native partner
but also increase the likelihood to be the main bread-winner in the family, the OLS will
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adequate measure for ambitions is available. Assuming that the ratio is indeed
exogenous, this finding indicates that intermarriage fosters – or is at least highly
correlates to – more equal supply for labor30.
Unfortunately, using this instrument to explain intermarriage behavior of natives is
difficult. There are hardly any theories explaining the driving factors for intermarriage
for natives, so that there is not justification why an ethnicity-gender ratio like this
should determine intermarriage choice among natives31. Trying to answer this question
is beyond the scope of this paper but seems crucial for fully understanding the
processes that determine intermarriage choice as a two-sided decision. But for now,
since intermarried and non-intermarried natives do not differ in their answers to the
big five questions, for instance, omitted variable biases might not be as important for
them as it is for immigrants.4.3. Robustness checks
One of the arguments made earlier about why intermarried couples might behave
differently than ethnically homogeneous couples is that bargaining power may be
distributed differently – presumably more in favor of the native partner. A first indicator
of this assumption was given in the descriptive section when two variables were discussed
that measure who has the decision power over income and who has the final say in financial
decisions. Similar variables have been introduced by Luehrmann and Maurer (2007),
Friedberg and Webb (2006) and Beegle et al. (2001) and they will be used now to proxy
bargaining strength. It is expected that intermarried immigrants are more likely to live in
partnerships where financial decisions are made collectively.
To make this correlation apparent, simple multinomial Logit regressions are run
using self-reported decision information (that is “distribution of income” and “final say
on financial decision”) as dependent variables and age and education as regressors
(Table 7). This is a very simple specification which does not account for various
problems related to, for instance, endogeneity or measurement errors. But for now the
purpose is merely to visualize some correlations leaving aside causal relations.
Estimation results refer to marginal effects on the probability that a particular
outcome is achieved. They indicate that there are no differences for natives and
immigrant women while for immigrant men intermarriage is highly correlated with
joint decision making.5. Conclusion
Marriages between members of different ethnic groups are among the crucial factors
driving social and economic harmonization. In that context, intermarriages serve as
indicator of social proximity and are often associated with individual economic success
of immigrants. However, little is known about the dynamics evolving within the couple,
in particular regarding the division of labor between spouses. This paper aims to fill
that gap (at least partly) by analyzing relative labor supply of intermarried couples in
comparison to immigrant and native couples.
The leading arguments that might explain differences in labor supply behavior,
especially less specialization in intermarriage, are based on two observations: First,
Table 7 Correlation between Intermarriage and Decision Power
Dep. Var.: Multinomial Logit
Distribution of income Immigrant Native
(=1 if \me“, =2 if \partner”, =3 if \shared”) Men Women Men Women
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “mainly me”)
Intermarriage -0.085** -0.034 0.029** 0.002
Education -0.008** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.013***
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “mainly partner”)
Intermarriage -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 0.003
Education -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.008***
Age 0.001 -0.000 0.001** -0.000
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “shared”)
Intermarriage 0.094** 0.036 -0.028 -0.006
Education 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.020*** 0.022***
Age 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
Dep. Var.: Multinomial Logit
Final say on financial decision Immigrant Native
(=1 if “me”, =2 if “partner”, =3 if “both”) Men Women Men Women
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “partner”)
Intermarriage -0.100** 0.002 0.025 0.021
Education -0.002 -0.007** -0.007*** -0.007***
Age -0.003** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001***
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “partner”)
Intermarriage 0.058** -0.024 -0.003 0.019
Education -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.011***
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “both”)
Intermarriage 0.041 0.022 -0.022 -0.040*
Education 0.014** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018***
Age 0.004** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.002***
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
People aged 20 to 65; year 2005 (financial decision), years 2004 and 2005 (agreement on income).
Entries refer to marginal effects on the probability that the variable takes on the particular outcome.
Clustered standard errors; * p ≤ 0:05, ** p ≤ 0:01, *** p ≤ 0:001.
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partners, is more pronounced in intermarriages than in other marital constellations,
possibly leading to less comparative advantages and therefore fewer incentives to
specialize. Second, bargaining positions of spouses in intermarriages differ from that in
immigrant or native marriages, probably due to different outside options, different
threat points and other factors determining bargaining strength.
Results from a two-limit Random Effects Tobit model are in line with these hypotheses
and regression estimates indicate that intermarried immigrants live in less specialized
partnerships than those in immigrant marriages. This result also holds when accounting
for possible endogeneity of intermarriage in an instrumental variable approach. In
contrast, natives in intermarriage are more specialized than those in native marriages
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native women in intermarriages.
This analysis is only a first step on the way to a better understanding of what makes
intermarried couples different and what drives their decisions. For further research it is
of particular importance to find out what determines the decision to intermarry for
natives if, for instance, immigrants are economically disadvantaged and intermarriages
prone to more conflicts than ethnically homogeneous marriages. Moreover, differences
in bargaining strength of spouses in different types of marriage should also be studied
in greater detail.
With increasing globalization and higher mobility of people, it is crucial for
multi-national and multi-cultural societies to better understand processes that
encourage social proximity and acceptance of different cultural backgrounds.
Intermarriages are in that context essential as they can build bridges and encourage social
interaction.Endnotes
1See e.g. Chiswick and Houseworth (2008), Furtado (2006), Furtado and Theodoropoulos
(2009b), and Meng and Gregory (2005) for more research on those topics.
2For the United States see Kantarevic (2004), for Australia Meng and Gregory (2005),
and for France Meng and Meurs (2006). Dribe and Lundh (2008) and Gevrek (2009)
address similar questions regarding immigrants in Sweden and the Netherlands, whereas
Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2009a; 2009b), and Georgarakos and Tatsiramos (2009)
consider employment and self-employment rates of U.S. immigrants.
3According to Blau et al. (2003) and Basilio et al. (2009) both immigrant husbands
and wives work less upon arrival than comparable natives but tend to invest in their
own human capital rather than specialize.
4For further information about this data source see for example Wagner et al. (2007).
5This relates to arguments given in models of collective labor supply where
bargaining strength depends on partners’ threat points and their outside options. For
more information about collective labor supply models, its assumptions, tests, and
implications see for instance: Van Klaveren et al. (2011); Blundell et al. (2007);
Attanasio and Lechene (2002); Chiappori et al. (2002); Lundberg and Pollak (1996);
or Chiappori (1988).
6Positive assortative mating, that is positive correlations between values of traits of
husbands and wives, also applies to IQ, height, attractiveness, skin color, and ethnic origin.
According to Becker (1985), there is no positive assortative mating by earnings. However,
this finding is discussed controversially in the literature.
7The instrumental variable approach used by Meng and Gregory (2005) and Meng
and Meurs (2006) to account for selection into intermarriage serves as the model for
the instrument used in this paper.
8Fernandez (2013) looks at the role of culture in the process of learning about female
labor force participation. She develops a dynamic model of culture in which (changing)
beliefs about the long-run effects of female labor force participation versus work at
home evolve into an intergenerational learning process. Relating this to immigrant
women from countries with more traditional gender roles, this would imply that they
Nottmeyer IZA Journal of Migration Page 24 of 272014, 3:3
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/3“learn” about the positive aspects of female labor force participation over time so that
their labor supply would increase with the time spent in the hosting country. The data
used in this paper indeed support this idea as the degree of specialization decreases
with the years spent in Germany for immigrant women. In addition, some ethnic
groups, like Turkish women, tend to specialize more while immigrants from EU member
states generally specialize less (Table 5).
9Related to this argument, Lundberg (2002) shows that if family members cannot
commit to household settings, in particular to the division of income in later years in
order to compensate the home worker for foregone earnings, then an inefficient degree
of specialization is chosen and too little of the household public good (e.g. childcare) is
provided.
10Testing this hypothesis Explicitly is beyond the scope of this paper. What can and
will be tested though with the available data are differences in the self-assessed power
over financial decisions between intermarried and ethnically homogeneous couples. In
addition, regressions including years since migration and coming from EU member
states indicate that both factors have significant implications for the degree of
specialization, leading to more equal division of labor market work (Table 5).
11Immigrants coming from countries with very traditional gender roles, like Turkey,
can be expected to specialize more. Regressions including dummies for Turkish
background show highly significant effects indicating more specialization among
Turkish immigrants (Table 5).
12See also Kalmijn et al. (2005), who study the relationship between intermarriage
and the risk of divorce in the Netherlands.
13In case both partners provide zero working hours the ratio is set to missing.
14Furthermore, in 1984, the first year of the panel, zero working hours are not
reported.
15It is assumed that cohabiting couples do not differ in their specialization behavior –
even though I acknowledge that Stratton (2005) finds differences in intra-household
specialization between cohabiting and married couples.
16This matching structure and the fact that people may have missing entries explain
slight differences in the descriptive statistics (Tables 1 and 2): For instance, the number
of labor hours for immigrant men in intermarriage equals 8.5, which deviates minimal
from the number of partner’s labor hours for native women in intermarriage, which is
8.6. Because a person can have different partners in different years or missing entries in
one year, these kind of deviations can occur.
17For unemployed reported hours of work are expected to equal zero. Observations of
people who give inconsistent answers are set to missing. Consequently, people who report
zero weekly working hours while being full-time, part-time or occasionally employed are
not considered, as are people who report positive hours of work while being unemployed.
People may work while being enrolled in school. So they are still included in the sample.
18Couples may drop in and out of the sample at different points in time. So this is
not a balanced panel and standard errors are corrected for this fluctuation.
19For more information about the big five and its construction in the SOEP see
Gerlitz and Schupp (2005) or Dehne and Schupp (2007).
20For further information about the historic evolution of immigration to Germany
see, for instance, Kalter and Granato (2007).
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http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/321This is not Explicitly shown in the Tables.
22Next to preferences this pattern can be explained also by group size differences:
The bigger the own ethnic group and the more potential partners are available within
the own ethnic community, the less likely it becomes to marry somebody from outside
that group. Members of the majority population as well as members of big minority
groups are thus more likely to marry a partner with the same ethnic background than
members of small ethnic groups.
23This information is not Explicitly shown in the tables but for a detailed
discussion of different marital patterns among non-German nationals see for
instance Gonzalez-Ferrer (2006), Haug (2006) or Schroedter (2006).
24Year dummies are also included to account for year effects. Instead of including
home country fix effects, targeted regressions are run using “coming from EU member
states” as additional regressor (see Table 5).
25Leaving out educational differences does not alter the main implication and the
significance of the intermarriage coefficient remains the same (see Table 5).
26Writing abilities are not included in the regression despite their availability in the
SOEP because answers to speaking and writing skills are highly correlated and would
induce multicollinearity.
27The estimated marginal effect of intermarriage for immigrant men increases from
0.129*** (Table 1) to 0.133*** in the restricted sample. Estimation results are not shown
in detail in this paper but are available upon request.
28This corresponds to arguments given by Fuwa (2004) for example.
29Ideally a closer regional frame would be preferred but this is not possible with the
data underlying in this study.
30Using this ethnicity-gender ratio as instrument works if living in a certain area
affects only the probability to intermarry but not the degree of specialization. However,
people with more egalitarian views, for instance, may live in areas with a more mixed
population such as bigger cities with a multi-cultural population – which increases
their probably to intermarry-, and(!) prefer less specialization within a partnership at
the same time. Estimation results should therefore be interpreted with caution and
what is shown should be viewed as correlation rather then clear causality.
31Glowsky (2007) is among the few studies that looks at intermarriage decisions of
native men in Germany.
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